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Authors’ notes 




In their target article, De Houwer, Hughes and Barnes-Holmes describe an 
archipelago of islands each colonised by a different tribe of psychologists, with little 
awareness of their neighbours. They focus particular attention on two tribes – the 
cognitivists and the functionalists – who appear to share many interests (they study 
the same topics, try to solve the same problems), but who have diverged in their 
scientific methods and theories. Worse, these two tribes communicate very little, and 
so don’t learn from each other. The authors are troubled by this, and so offer the 
tribes a solution, focusing on application.    
The paper’s central claims are that, 1) the tribes different approaches should not be 
seen as being in conflict, but as mutually supportive, 2) progress in understanding 
topics (or solving problems) would be enhanced if the tribes communicated, 3) 
different ways of combining functional and cognitive approaches are possible,  4) the 
focus of the communication should be on the shared functionalist core, 5) most 
progress will be made by taking an analytic-abstractive theoretical approach and 6) 
the applied members of the two tribes could merge to become psychological 
engineers.  Broadly, our agreement is negatively correlated with position in this 
numbered list. Consequently, we are doubtful that the specifics of their proposal will 
achieve their intended goal … And we really don’t want to be called psychological 
engineers.  
Shared perspectives  
Largely, we agreed with the thrust of the early sections of the paper. Different 
functional (behaviourist) and cognitive (mentalist) accounts of a behavioural 
phenomenon should be possible without the two accounts being antagonistic. 
Communication between areas is both valuable and to be encouraged. Indeed, we 
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would go further and argue that there are yet other approaches carried out by other 
tribes on other islands who could usefully join the conversation. The functional 
imaging tribe have been particularly active of late, but there are other tribes 
(biologists, pharmacologists, sociologists, anthropologists…)  who each have 
something valuable to say about diverse behavioural phenomena.   
We further agree that a functional approach to describing phenomena is central to 
good psychological science, irrespective of one's theoretical position. It is important 
to have a clear understanding of the relationship between independent and 
dependent variables; such is the knowledge base upon which theories are inspired 
and tested. In essence, this is simply good scientific practice, because a good 
experimental design entails the precise specifications of the environmental 
conditions required to bring about a behavioural effect. The failure to maintain high 
standards in this regard is part of the underlying cause of the recent replicability 
crisis in science.  Unless one is very sure of a phenomenon, generating explanations 
(i.e. taking a theoretical position) is premature. Thus, to us, method and findings 
trump theorising.  
We also agree that a pervasive problem in cognitive psychology is to confuse 
empirical phenomena with the theories that seek to explain why those phenomena 
occur. De Houwer et al.'s term 'proxies' provides a useful label for this error. Without 
wishing to raise heckles by picking upon specific examples, it strikes us that broad 
concepts such as “executive function”, “inhibition” or “metacognition” are often used 
loosely, and in ways not justified by the highly paradigm specific measures 
employed. As an illustration of this danger, Shilling, Chetwynd and Rabbitt (2002) 
looked at age-related changes in “inhibitory deficits” across 4 variations of the classic 
Stroop task involving stimuli that could be processed in two conflicting ways (based 
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on colours, numbers, spatial location and figure vs ground conflicts). All four tasks 
showed the predicted age-related pattern, but the shared variance between tasks 
was zero. That is, there was no overall inhibitory deficit that the measures shared, 
despite the surface similarity in the tasks.   
Finally, we agree with what we take to be one of the main intents of the target article 
-  to encourage and develop a common language -  by which researchers of different 
theoretical backgrounds can communicate and collaborate effectively. However, 
where we start to diverge from the authors is whether a new shared language is 
required.  
A parting of the ways  
De Houwer and colleagues argue that “communication between applied 
psychologists can be improved by adopting a common analytic-abstractive language 
that is phrased in terms of general functional principles” (p.28). They go to some 
length to explain that this functional analytic-abstractive language is a language of 
explanations (theories), rather than a description of effects (which they call 
“functional effect-centric” research). Functional analytic-abstractive theories, they 
argue, are expressed in sufficiently general terms that they can make predictions, 
and those predictions are testable (and hence potentially wrong). 
To us, this proposal risks substituting one kind of proxy error with another. Just as 
cognitive psychologists often confuse their explanations with observations so too, it 
seems, functional psychologists sometimes confuse their non-cognitive abstractive 
theories with the observations they are intended to explain.  
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For example, we have no problem with the authors' assertion that “both the lever 
pressing of a rat in a Skinner box as well as the tantrum of a small child at home can 
be described as instances of the general functional principle of reinforcement”, nor 
with their assertion that such a theory allows one to theorize that one could “reduce 
the frequency of tantrums by instructing a parent to ignore the child when it has a 
tantrum”. These are indeed good examples of a theory couched in functional terms. 
However, at this level of abstraction, a functional account is no more a description of 
specific observed phenomena than is a theory expressed in cognitive terms.  The 
authors' proposal – that psychologists should talk in a common language of 
functional abstractions – seems unlikely to lead to progress. Scientists of different 
scientific persuasions can profitably communicate in terms of observed phenomena; 
communicating in terms of different abstractions is likely to be less productive. 
To illustrate this point, consider heavenly bodies. From a common set of 
observations, Copernican astronomers proposed that planets moved in perfectly 
circular orbits, whilst Keplerian astronomers proposed elliptical orbits. How should 
these two astronomical tribes talk to each other?  De Houwer et al.'s proposal is akin 
to the suggestion that they should communicate in the common language of, say, 
Copernican circular orbits. However, Keplerian astronomy turned out to be the better 
theory. It seems there would have been little to be gained in encouraging Keplerian 
theorists to use the common language of Copernicus. The common language of 
science, we argue, should be the observations, both those already made, and those 
one would wish to make in the future to distinguish the theories. Of course, Keplerian 
astronomers did eventually convince their field to theorize in their terms, but this was 
because their theory provided a better explanation of the observed phenomena. 
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Perhaps, one day, either functional or cognitive theories will 'win' in a similarly 
decisive manner --- but that day has not yet arrived. 
We believe that the common language for functional and cognitive theorists 
(and the other tribes) should be known observations and (possibly diverging) 
predictions. There seems to be some chance that people of different theoretical 
persuasions might agree on what has been reliably observed, and so what is worth 
testing in the future (perhaps because they disagree on what will be observed when 
such observations are made). Such an approach is increasingly used to establish 
common ground between different theoretical approaches within cognition, such as 
adversarial collaborations in which the predictions are agreed in advance (e.g. 
Dwyer & Waldmann, 2016) or distributed collaboration in which data sets that are 
independently replicated are shared to facilitate formal model testing (e.g. Wills et 
al., 2017, Wills & Pothos, 2012). Thus we think that what De Houwer et al describe 
as 'effect-centric functional research' provides the ideal basis, and indeed probably 
the only workable basis, for collaboration between researchers of different theoretical 
persuasions and moreover that formal means for communication and collaboration 
already exist. We also believe that it provides the best approach to applied research, 
as we outline below.  
Another of De Houwer et al.'s proposals is that the “cognitively-inspired analytic-
abstractive approach to applied psychology combines the best of both worlds (i.e. 
levels of explanation) and can thus maximize progress'' (p. 27, emphasis added). We 
are skeptical about this proposal, and the example given in the target article 
concerning dot-probe and Stroop effects (p.25--27) did not convince us. Their 
example begins (on page 25) with a purely functional account of the dot-probe task. 
They then go on to say:  
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“… functional knowledge about proportion-congruency effects in Stroop studies and 
cognitive models of these effects can be used to inspire research on dot-probe-based training. 
For instance, it has been demonstrated that proportion-congruency effects are highly 
stimulus-dependent (e.g., Schmidt & Besner, 2008) suggesting that these effects are not due 
to conflict adaptation via changes in the deployment of attention to task-irrelevant stimuli. 
Instead, proportion-congruency effects have been explained by episodic memory models that 
operate solely on the basis of general principles of memory storage and retrieval (e.g., 
Schmidt, 2013). This functional and cognitive knowledge about proportion-congruency 
effects in Stroop tasks sheds new light on the fact that dot-probe-based training effects show 
little transfer (i.e., also seem to be stimulus-specific; see Koster & Bernstein, 2015, for a 
review). (p 26-27).  
It seems to us that the (rather minimal) cognitive theorizing in this example 
could be removed without much being lost. As an exercise, re-read the quotation 
above, skipping over the italicised text. To us, this does not affect the argument, 
which appears to be made on purely functional principles. We found the functional 
argumentation rather interesting, and a good illustration of the utility of a functional 
analytic-abstractive approach. It's a similar feeling we get when reading a good piece 
of cognitively-inspired prediction.  It just seems to us that it would be better, and 
more realistic, to assume that theorists will use whatever theoretical approach they 
are most familiar or content with, and count on the presumption that for different 
researchers, this will be different theories. Thus, the field as whole can benefit from a 
plurality of approaches, without assuming such plurality need reside within individual 
researchers, or that all researchers should adopt such plurality. 
As an aside, we think it rather telling that the authors acknowledge that the kind of 
research they believe ought to be popular (cognitively-inspired analytic-abstractive) 
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actually isn’t, and that “there are few if any examples of this type of research in the 
applied psychology literature” (p.17). They attribute this absence to the troubled 
history between the cognitive and functional tribes, but we suspect that if it were a 
valuable way forward, enterprising researchers would have discovered it by now. 
Moreover, given that the authors themselves struggle to generate a convincing 
example of such an approach, we suspect that the approach may not be particularly 
fruitful, and are therefore unconvinced that it represents “a promising avenue for 
applied researchers” (p.17).  
We also question what is meant by “maximising progress” in applied research. If the 
goal is draw out general principles, then we accept that broader levels of analysis 
and theorising may be appropriate. However, the broader the theorising, then 
potentially the less precise the prediction that an explanation (theory) provides in any 
particular situation, and so potentially the lower the utility and testability of the 
account. Too many psychological theories are cast in this way, and so very hard to 
apply with any confidence to specific situations. For instance, there is a wealth of 
research looking at the effects of stress on memory, but this is so vaguely cast that it 
is impossible to predict with any certainty how a particular individual will recall a 
particular stressful event, and at the same time, impossible to assert with any 
authority that a particular observation refutes the theory.  
In contrast, if the goal is to optimise a behavioural outcome in a particular setting, 
then we believe that the most progress is likely to be made by designing experiments 
that mimic that situation as closely as possible. That is, to conduct well motivated 
effect-centric research.  For example, in the field of eyewitness identification 
research the goal is to discover ways of conducting identification tests that maximise 
the quality of evidence obtained. Consequently, researchers strive to mimic key 
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aspects of the identification task, and then manipulate it in ways that are either 
purely functional (e.g. Levi, 1998), or cognitively-inspired (Perfect & Weber, 2012). In 
either case, the goal is the same, and is specific to lineup choices: there is no aim to 
draw abstract conclusions about the nature of decision making, or to generalise to 
other kinds of tasks.  
It is also possible to think of examples where different researchers address the same 
topic with different orientations. Recent research on the testing effect can be cast in 
terms of the theoretical understanding of the cognitive (or functional) principles 
illuminated by the testing effect (e.g. Knight, Ball, Brewer, DeWitt & Marsh, 2012), or 
in terms of an attempt to maximise student performance on a final test (e.g. Pan, 
Gopal & Rickard, 2016). Researchers with the first orientation are likely to take an 
abstractive theoretical approach and seek to understand the basic principles that 
might apply whenever material is reprocessed after a delay. Those with a more 
applied approach are interested to know the conditions (the delay, the materials, the 
instructions etc.) under which testing is beneficial.  It is hard to generate an approach 
that combines these two approaches that will maximise progress, because they are 
progressing toward different goals.  
Our central point here is that in order to maximise progress, one must know what 
one is progressing towards, and we suspect that the majority of applied researchers 
would want to make progress on specific problems.  In part, we suspect that this 
reflects the relatively poor evidence for far-transfer effects in psychology. To take a 
single recent example, the evidence strongly suggests that “brain training” has large 
effects on the trained skill, but small to non-existent benefits on distantly related 
tasks or on everyday life (Simons, Boot, Charness et al, 2016). The corollary of this 
point is that if one wishes to solve real-world problems, then progress is best made 
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by creating laboratory analogs that are as close to those problems as possible: 
abstracting away from those problems may lead to failures of transfer. Thus, there 
seem to be some dangers inherent in an overly-abstractive approach, particularly in 
applied contexts. 
Should JARMAC become the Journal for Psychological Engineering?  
Finally, we'd caution against adoption of the term 'psychological engineering' for both 
sociological and conceptual reasons. From the perspective of 20th century history 
and dystopian science fiction, we find the term 'psychological engineering' vaguely 
terrifying. We're not sure we want our psyche engineered, and we suspect the term 
would win applied psychologists few friends in the wider media. The authors must, 
we are sure, be aware of the surface-similar term 'social engineering' and its use 
within information security to refer to making use of peoples' cognitive and social 
weaknesses to obtain confidential information. However effective such approaches 
are (and they do seem rather effective), it is presumably not a sphere of human 
endeavour with which most applied psychologists would want to associate. 
At a deeper level, the term 'psychological engineering' will inevitably be contrasted 
with the pre-existing term 'psychological science'. We doubt that many applied 
psychologists would consider the relationship between applied and non-applied 
psychology to be similar to the relationship between science and engineering. The 
flow of theoretical knowledge between science and engineering is largely one way. 
For example, civil engineering applies known theory in physics to build bridges that 
don't (usually) fall down. The theory used is Newtonian, and the theory has remained 
unchanged for centuries. Newtonian theory is unlikely to be further refined by civil 
engineers, however many more bridges they build. Nor is it likely that, in the absence 
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of the advances in theoretical physics through the 20th Century, Newton’s laws would 
have been overturned by engineers.  
In contrast, we suspect many applied psychologists, particularly those who consider 
themselves to be 'cognitive', are motivated, at least in part, because of the potential 
to contribute to psychological theory. At least one major applied journal (the Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: Applied) describes its explicit aim as being to bridge 
practical problems and psychological theory. We suspect some applied researchers 
believe that working on applied problems is sometimes a better way to advance 
theory over entirely non-applied laboratory work. They may be right, although 
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